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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THI8 COURT 
DECIDED A KEY ISSUE WHICH HAD NEITHER BEEN 
RAISED NOR BRIEFED BY THE PARTIES. 
A. Introduction 
A key issue in this case is whether or not Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7-3-3 (1971 and Supp. 1980) applies to the facts of this case. 
Indeed if § 7-3-3 applies, plaintiff wins! It is that simple.1 
Both appellants and appellees assumed2 that § 7-3-3 
applied to the facts of this case. (Compare Appellants' Brief at 
p. 20-24 and Appellees1 Brief at p. 14) . However, without the 
benefit of briefing or argument, this Court sua sponte ruled that 
§ 7-3-3 did not apply in this case. fSlip Opinion at p. 5). 
B. Comparison of Language 
It is uncontested that Grove Finance was receiving money 
on deposit. Plaintiffs therefore reasoned that § 7-3-3 was 
triggered. However, this Court sua sponte interpreted the statute 
!This case turns on whether or not the plaintiffs had a "duty" 
to plaintiffs as individuals. If § 7-3-3 applies, several duties 
(owed directly to plaintiffs as individuals) are triggered by 
statute. (See generally, Appellants1 Reply Brief at p. 7). 
2The parties' assumption that § 7-3-3 applied to this case was 
based upon the plain language of the statute. "Where statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond 
the same to divine legislative intent." forinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 
779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). 
1 
in a contrary manner. For the convenience of the Court the 
language of the statute and this Court's opinion are compared side 
by side: 
Any corporation holding itself 
out to the public as receiving 
money in deposit whether 
evidenced by a certificate, 
promissory note or otherwise, 
shall be considered as doing a 
banking business and shall be 
subject to the provisions of 
this chapter as to such 
business. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-3-3. 
An entity that conducts an 
unauthorized or unlicensed 
banking business does not by 
virtue of that illegal conduct 
become a bank. Thus, even if 
the statutory provisions 
regulating licensed banking 
businesses [viz. § 7-3-3] 
create a special relationship 
from which a duty of care 
arises, those duties do not 
apply here because Grove was 
not a bank, but was instead 
conducting an unauthorized 
banking business. 
Slip Opinion at p. 5. 
C. Analysis 
The problem is that this Court's opinion introduces 
several limitations not specifically mentioned in the statute. 
Thus this Court has engrafted into the statute the concepts of an 
"unauthorized or unlicensed banking business" and "illegal 
conduct." However, the statute does not use such words. 
If the issue of statutory construction had been raised, 
appellants would have cited the Court to Savage Industries v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991): 
The terms of a statute should be interpreted 
in accord with usually accepted meanings. In 
construing legislative enactments, the 
reviewer assumes that each term in the statute 
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words 
are read literally unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
Indeed in a prior opinion in this very case, this Court 
stated: 
Furthermore, in asking us to rule that an 
entire sentence of the statute had absolutely 
no meaning at all, they have ignored our 
fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, 
to every word of the statute. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n. 11 (1988). 
In summary, this Court's opinion holds that the 
protection of § 7-3-3 begins when a corporation happens to buy a 
banking license. However, as in this case, it is possible for a 
corporation to "hold itself out to the public as receiving money on 
deposit," long before that same corporation has bothered to get a 
license.3 Therefore it was perfectly reasonable for the 
Legislature to provide statutory protection from the time that the 
corporation began accepting "deposits" from the general public. 
Rehearing should be granted because this Court ruled on 
a critical issue never raised by the parties. Furthermore, this 
Court ruled on that crucial issue without the benefit of briefing 
3Indeed this Court reasons that plaintiffs were "depositors" 
in a bank. This Court held that the UCCC does not apply to 
plaintiffs because "By their own admission, plaintiffs were not 
consumer debtors; they were depositors." (Slip Opinion at p. 8). 
But if plaintiffs were depositors in a "bank," then the duties owed 
pursuant to Section 7-3-3 apply to plaintiffs. 
3 
or argument. The parties were thus denied an opportunity to 
properly present this issue to the court. 
POINT II 
REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THIS COURT OVERLOOKED 
THE FACT THAT IT TOOK OVER A DECADE BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER 
OF BANKS CLOSED GROVE FINANCE, 
Plaintiffs are depositors in the now defunct Grove 
Finance. Plaintiffs claim that the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions was negligent in supervising Grove Finance. 
This Court's opinion states: 
On discovering that Grove was engaged in 
transactions that could be construed as a 
banking operation, Borthick took steps to stop 
it from doing so. He issued a cease and 
desist order, and when that was ignored, 
Borthick closed Grove. We find no statutory 
provision in Title 7 that even arguably 
imposed any other duty on the Commissioner. 
In halting Grove's practices, Borthick did the 
only thing that could have been done under the 
circumstances. 
Slip Opinion at p. 7. 
This opinion is correct as far as it goes. However, the 
Court has overlooked the fact that Grove Finance operated for over 
a decade before it was closed. During this entire decade, the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions had a statutory duty to 
inspect Grove Finance. See Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-8. Thus, 
rehearing should be granted to consider whether it was negligent 
for the Commissioner of Financial Institutions to wait over ten 
years before closing Grove Finance. 
4 
POINT III 
REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE OF A "SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP" IS SIMPLY A VARIETY OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
WHICH HAS BEEN ABROGATED BY STATUTE, 
It is absolutely clear that governmental immunity has 
been abrogated by statute in this case. See Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). Nevertheless, this Court correctly noted 
that plaintiffs must still show a duty which has been breached. 
(Slip Opinion at p. 4.) 
The problem arises in defining the nature or extent of 
that duty. Specifically, this Court held that plaintiffs must 
establish a specialized and highly restrictive type of "duty."4 
Thus the opinion states: 
Thus for plaintiffs' claim to survive, they 
must establish the existence of a special 
relationship that imposes a duty of care on 
the commissioners for the benefit of 
plaintiffs as individuals. 
Slip Opinion at p. 4. 
However, this Court's opinion overlooks the fact that the 
so-called "special relationship" duty is simply another form of 
governmental immunity. (See generally Brief of Appellant at p. 32-
36 and Appellants' Reply Brief at p. 10-14.) 
4In a traditional common law tort case, foreseeability is 
usually sufficient to establish a duty. See e.g. Milliner v. Elmer 
Fox and Co. , 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974); Coffey v. Milwaukee. 247 
N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976). 
5 
Although the briefs cite many cases on this point, a very 
good textual analysis of the issue is as follows: 
Some jurisdictions, once adherents of the 
general duty/special duty dichotomy applied in 
determining the liability of governmental 
defendants for negligence in the absence of 
governmental or sovereign immunity; have 
abandoned the rule in favor of the traditional 
negligence standard, without regard to the 
nature of the defendant as a state or local 
governmental body. . . . The public duty 
doctrine has been described as a rule of "duty 
to all, duty to no-one," and considered 
outmoded, artificial, in reality a form of 
sovereign immunity. and a product of 
circuitous reasoning, since the arguments used 
to defend it are the same raised in defense of 
general sovereign immunity. It sets up the 
same type of artificial distinction employed 
with respect to governmental and proprietary 
functions. Other authority has abandoned the 
test as a speculative exercise reinstating 
governmental immunity by another name. 
contrary to the state's judicially announced 
policy that liability is the rule and immunity 
the exception. As a practical matter, perhaps 
the most persuasive reason advanced for 
abandoning the public duty rule is that it 
creates needless confusion in the law and 
produces uneven and inequitable results in 
practice. 
Courts that abandon the rule sometimes rely on 
provisions and statutes abrogating sovereign 
immunity and stating that public entities are 
to be treated like private parties for the 
purposes of determining liability, or find 
that the doctrine should be rejected as 
affording special protection to government by 
creating an immunity outside the scope of 
extant statutory provisions. 
57 Am. Jur.2d Municipal. County. School and State Tort Liability § 
144 (2nd ed. 1988) (Emphasis added.) 
6 
This case offers the first clear opportunity for this 
Court to determine whether the "special relationship" duty is 
simply another form of governmental immunity which has been 
abrogated by statute. Rehearing should be granted to analyze this 
important issue which was overlooked by this Court's opinion. 
DATED this /? ""day of April, 1993. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
fff^,ROBERT J. DEBRY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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